Abstract-We consider the design and analysis of robust distributed control systems (DCSs) to ensure the detection of integrity attacks. DCSs are often managed by independent agents and are implemented using a diverse set of sensors and controllers. However, the heterogeneous nature of DCSs along with their scale leave such systems vulnerable to adversarial behavior. To mitigate this reality, we provide tools that allow operators to prevent zero dynamics attacks when as many as p agents and sensors are corrupted. Such a design ensures attack detectability in deterministic systems while removing the threat of a class of stealthy attacks in stochastic systems. To achieve this goal, we use graph theory to obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for the presence of zero dynamics attacks in terms of the structural interactions between agents and sensors. We then formulate and solve optimization problems which minimize communication networks while also ensuring a resource limited adversary cannot perform a zero dynamics attacks. Polynomial time algorithms for design and analysis are provided.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed control systems (DCSs) have become prevalent in today's world. A DCS is a system where components such as sensors, actuators, and controllers are separated over a large network. DCSs allows operators to control multiple local environments while simultaneously meeting various global objectives. The ability of a DCS to meet society's demands for large scale control has made such systems common in a variety of applications including sensor networks, the smart grid, vehicular systems, and manufacturing.
Nonetheless, distributed control systems provide attack surfaces for potential adversaries [1] . Indeed DCS rely on spatially distributed heterogenous subsystems and components, many of which are left unsupervised, creating vulnerability. Moreover, the health of a DCS may be dependent on the actions of multiple, possibly colluding, agents. Serious breaches have occured in control systems, for instance the Stuxnet attack [2] and the Maroochy Shire Incident [3] .
We consider the setting of a DCS with up to p malicious agents or sensors. Our goal is to provide tools which allow an operator to characterize and design DCSs that can not be targeted by zero dynamics attacks. We demonstrate that implementing a zero dynamics attack is both necessary and sufficient for an adversary to remain stealthy in a DCS with deterministic dynamics and unknown initial state. We also S. Weerakkody show such an attack allows an adversary to remain hidden in stochastic systems. Remaining stealthy is a powerful capability, allowing attackers to act on a DCS unencumbered.
For a fixed set of attacked nodes, a zero dynamics attacks does not exist if and only if the attacker's subsystem is left invertible and strongly observable. Prior work [4] - [6] proves that these properties are, for almost all valid numerical realizations, linked to the structure of a system, defined by the interactions of the inputs, states, and outputs. Boukhobza et al. [5] derive sufficient and necessary graphical conditions which ensure structural left invertibility and strong observability. From a security perspective, these results assume the set of adversarial nodes is known. We extend this work by providing sufficient and necessary conditions, which guarantee no zero dynamics attacks exist from any feasible set of malicious nodes. We call a system that does not satisfy these conditions discreetly attackable. In special cases, we offer efficient algorithms that can verify these conditions.
From a design perspective, we address tradeoffs between the costs of communication and sensing and security requirements. Here, we formulate and solve optimization problems which minimize a linear function of the number of communication links and sensors in our DCS while ensuring our system is not discreetly attackable. In addition, we include constraints on which agents are allowed to communicate. We show that if communication is more costly than sensing, it is optimal to observe all agents, while if sensing is more costly than communicating it is optimal to observe the fewest number of agents that enable secure system design.
Prior work has characterized when systems are vulnerable to undetectable attacks to motivate robust design. Liu et al. [7] provided algebraic conditions which determine when the smart grid is vulnerable to stealthy attacks. Additionally, Mo et al. [8] consider stochastic systems and determine the extent to which an adversary can covertly bias a system's state. Zero dynamics attacks have been previously considered in both centralized control systems [9] and [10] and distributed algorithms [11] , [12] . Here, Sundaram et al. in [11] determine graphical conditions under which a set of agents can resiliently compute an arbitrary function of their initial states. Pasqualetti et al. in [12] characterize attack identifiability/detectability from each node using connectivity.
We extend the work of Sundaram et al. [11] by focusing on the problem of attack detection and providing graphical conditions for the absence of zero dynamics attacks in the more general case that there are no self-loops among system agents. We also extend the work of Pasqualetti et al. in [12] which considers consensus systems and requires the network to be strongly connected. Specifically, we focus on general control systems and a DCS which may or may not be connected and derive conditions under which a single central operator can perform detection and identification. Moreover, we extend the works of both [11] and [12] by considering the problem of minimal robust DCS design.
Additionally, we examined the analysis and design of DCSs to prevent perfect attacks in our prior work [13] , [14] . The set of perfect attacks are the complete set of stealthy attacks in deterministic control systems when the defender knows the initial state. We extend these prior results by considering a richer attack model, the zero dynamics attack, where we remove the defender's knowledge of the initial state. Designing a DCS to avoid perfect attacks will be insufficient to prevent zero dynamics attack (which are practically just as stealthy), thus motivating our efforts.
Notation 
Algebraic Model: We assume each agent x i has a scalar time dependent state x i (k) with dynamics given as follows:
The input u i (k) is a linear function of the states of x i 's incoming neighbors and a centrally known input u
where
Each agent is assumed to have a scalar state though vector states can be examined. The state x i (k) can refer to a physical quantity such as temperature or simply a quantity for distributed processing (e.g. consensus).
A set of dedicated sensors Y measure the state of a subset of agents. The outputs are sent to a central operator for estimation and detection. A dedicated sensor measures the state of one agent and no two sensors measure the same agent. The output of sensor y i measuring x j at time k is
Remark 1: The assumption of dedicated sensors is made since the system is distributed and no one sensor likely can measure the states of multiple agents. Redundant sensors are ignored as it is assumed that if an attacker can corrupt one sensor measuring x i , it can corrupt all sensors measuring x i , especially if the hardware is identical. For simplicity, we concatenate state and output vectors
so that the dynamics of the full control system are given by
The pair (A, C) is assumed to be observable. Letting 1 be the indicator function, A and C can be defined entrywise:
The state x(0) is unknown to the operator. Since (A, C) is observable, the state can be estimated using a linear filter.
Here, K is chosen so (A−KCA) is Schur stable. The residue z(k) is a statistic often used to perform detection. Smaller residues are often indicative of normal behavior while larger residues are associated with faulty or malicious behavior.
III. ATTACK MODEL Graphical Model:
In this section we define our DCS model under attack. At time 0 an unknown subset of the agents and sensors F are compromised. No more than p agents and sensors can be corrupted. In other words, the operator would like the system to be resilient to up to p malicious failures. The set of all feasible sets of attacked nodes is given by F:
We define the graph
, and u a (k), we have :
The estimator policy remains unchanged during an attack.
IV. ZERO DYNAMICS ATTACKS
In this section we determine the conditions which allow an adversary to inject an undetectable attack. We assume the goal of an attacker is to affect the state of the DCS without being detected, thus preventing operator interference.
Theorem 2 ( [12]):
A nonzero attack u a (k) is stealthy for time k ≥ 0, if and only if there exists δx(0) which satisfies
Such an attack is known as a zero dynamics attack [9] , [10] . Zero dynamics attacks are the only set of attacks which allow an adversary to remain stealthy in deterministic systems with unknown initial state. Even if the defender has some understanding of the initial state, a zero dynamics attack remains stealthy for sufficiently small δx(0).
Theorem 3: Consider the system under attack (11), (12) , (13), (14) and the system operating normally (5),(6), (7) . Define the residue bias due to an attack to be
The proof is omitted due to space considerations. Since the matrix A − KCA is Schur stable, A − AKC is also Schur stable and the residue bias Δz(k) approaches 0, allowing an adversary to remain stealthy against operators who use residue based detectors. For general detectors, it can be shown that a quadratic function of the residue bias is linked to optimal decay rates on the probability of false alarm [15] .
Remark 4: Zero dynamics attacks are also stealthy in more realistic stochastic systems where there exists both process and sensor noise. It can be shown that Theorem 3 holds in this case as well. Thus, designing systems which do not contain zero dynamics attacks, is a necessary condition for attack detectability in stochastic systems. To design systems with no feasible zero dynamics attacks we introduce strong observability and left invertibility.
Definition 5:
We now obtain the following as a result of Theorem 2. 
We note here that G is associated with the structural system ([A], [C] ). It can be shown that a system's structure can be linked to left invertibility and strong observability. Remark 9: In [13] , [14] , we designed DCSs to avoid a class of stealthy attacks knowns as perfect attacks. The set of zero dynamics attacks is a richer set of attacks. As we will later show, designing minimal DCSs that avoid perfect attacks leaves a system vulnerable to zero dynamics attacks.
Remark 10: While we have designed our system to ensure deterministic detection, this work also allows us to design a DCS that can perform perfect attack identification. Specifically, a system which can detect 2p adversaries, can perform perfect identification in the presence of p attackers.
V. GRAPH THEORY PRELIMINARIES
In this section we introduce necessary preliminaries from graph theory. Consider a graph G = (V, E). Two edges A vertex separator between a ∈ V and b ∈ V is a set S ⊂ V \{a, b} whose removal deletes all paths from a to b. As shorthand, we refer to S as a vertex separator between (a, b). A minimum vertex separator S between (a, b) is a vertex separator between (a, b) with the smallest size.
Theorem 11 (Menger [17] ): The size of a minimum vertex separator S between (a, b) is equal to the maximum number of internally disjoint paths between a and b.
We define the set of essential vertices, V ess (A, B) ⊂ V :
Suppose we add new vertices a and b to graph G where a has directed edges to A and b has directed edges coming from B. Then, we have V ess (A, B) = ∪ S∈S S, where S is the set of all minimum vertex separators between (a, b).
VI. STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF STEALTHY ATTACKS
In this section, we obtain structural conditions to describe when our DCS is discreetly attackable. To obtain the most general result, we first remove our prior assumption that each agent has its own self-loop and each sensor measures a dedicated state. Moreover we define the graph f (G) (V ∪ o, E ) by adding a node o with incoming directed edges from all sensors Y to graph G. We have the following:
Theorem 12: A DCS is not discreetly attackable iff: C1 For all T ⊂ X ∪Y with |T | = p, θ(X , (X ∪Y)\T ) = n. C2 For all x i ∈ X, the minimum vertex separator
Proof: Sufficiency: We leverage the following result: Lemma 13 ( [5] , [6] 
C2 =⇒ cii, ciii: Suppose C2 holds. Then, cii trivially follows for all F ∈ F. Now, WLOG, assume F = {x l1 , · · · , x lq , y lq+1 , · · · , y lp }. Suppose ciii does not hold so there exists 
We let δx(0) = e i , the ith canonical basis vector. WLOG, let S * 
Note any vertex x j ∈ X not in a x i -rooted path, cannot be part of a U 
is the portion C associated with Y/S * i . Since X 1 and X 2 are not part of x irooted paths, they cannot be affected by X 3 , X 4 . Since X 2 , X 3 are not part of Y/S * i -topped paths, they do not affect X 4 or
In the special case that S * i ⊂ Y, X 4 = ∅ and the result follows. WLOG, assume Let δx j (k) be states associated withX j . Leveraging Lemma 16 and the fact that onlyX 5 has edges from U a F :
Recall, that u a (k) is chosen so that δx 5 (k) = 0. We then have that δy Y/S * i (k) = 0 and Theorem 12 holds. In prior work [13] , [14] , it was determined that at least p sensors were required to prevent perfect attacks. Removing knowledge of the initial state increases this requirement.
Corollary 17: A system is not discreetly attackable only if it contains at least p + 1 sensors. Now that we have examined the general case, we wish to consider the instance where each agent has a self-loop.
Corollary 18: Suppose each agent x i ∈ X has a self-loop. A DCS is not discreetly attackable iff the minimum vertex separator S i between (x i , o) has size |S i | ≥ p + 1.
Proof: It is sufficient to show that the self-loop condition implies ci for all F ∈ F. WLOG, assume an arbitrary set of nodes F are attacked,
Remark 19: In [13] , [14] , we showed that having at least p disjoint paths from each agent x i to o is necessary and sufficient to avoid perfect attacks. To prevent zero dynamics attacks, an extra disjoint path from x i to o is required.
If f (G) has self-loops at each agent, we can efficiently determine if a system is discreetly attackable. To determine if a fixed agent (x i , o) has minimum vertex separator S i of size p +1, we solve a 0 − 1 maximum flow problem. We consider a graph This outperforms algebraic methods based on the matrix pencil [16] and graphical methods based on Lemma 13 which verify a system's strong observability/left invertibility for fixed attack nodes. This is a combinatorial task since there exists n+m p possible attack vectors.
VII. DISTRIBUTED CONTROL SYSTEM DESIGN
Now that we determined structural conditions characterizing zero dynamics attacks, we consider the problem of design. Here, we aim to secure our system against p adversaries while minimizing costs of sensing and communication.
Communication Design: We first assume the structure of C, or [C] is given. Due to physical/cost constraints on communication, certain agents can not communicate. This is encoded into [Ā], where [Ā] ji = 0 iff it is feasible for agent x i to send messages to agent x j . Again, let S i be a minimal vertex separator between (x i , o) in f (G). We have:
The objective function represents the number of communication links in our system. The first constraint ensures that our system is not discreetly attackable, while Solve maximum flow algorithm on h i (f (G)) from source x i to sink o. Proof: A * 0 = (p + 2)n − m so the optimal value of (21) is (α 2 − α 1 )m + α 1 (p + 2)n. The result follows. When α 1 > α 2 , m = n and an optimal C * satisfies C * ij = 0 ⇐⇒ i = j. Alternatively, when α 2 > α 1 we must first obtain a set of dedicated sensors [C * ] with C * ∈ R p * ×n which makes Problem (20) feasible. Given C * , Problem (21) can be then solved using Problem (20). However, determining p * appears to be a combinatorial problem. Future work aims to discover efficient solutions.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We considered the analysis and design of distributed control systems to prevent zero dynamics attacks. We obtained a graphical condition to characterize the absence of zero dynamics attacks and demonstrated that in certain cases this condition was efficiently verifiable. We then consider the minimal design of DCSs to balance robustness with the cost of communication/sensing. Future work will consider a defender that has partial knowledge of the initial state and communication links/sensors with unique non-uniform costs.
